THE RISE OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
IN THE UNITED STATES.
PART I.

It is the object of this paper to touch but lightly on the
several steps that have been taken to broaden the powers of
the Supreme Court of the United States; to show how these
steps have lead to the construction of a strong central government; to show how, in the construction of this strong central
government, the judicial department has been made almost
despotic in its independent supremacy, and finally to pay a
brief tribute to the leading characters, who, despite opposition
and without precedent to guide them, labored consistently to
build up a governmental system remarkable for its peculiarity
and its strength.
There is much to be said in explanation of the many new
and often unpopular opinions which have become parts of our
fundamental law, but space will not allow us to go beyond a
passing delineation of the chief points in a few of the more
important decisions.
In speaking of the jurists who took the leading part in
building up the national system of jurisprudence, there are
many thoughts and bits of history that press upon attention.
We must, however, leave much of this untouched, and only
present here and there a prominent figure clad in a few of his
most strikingly intellectual robes and surrounded, perhaps,
by those who occupied the foreground in the picture of his
career.
The sessions of the National Court were, at the opening of
the period to which reference is made, held for the first time
in Washington, and to that new city came the flower of the
Republic's bar. They proceeded to try such cases as 1l7arbtry
v. 3adison, an early example of strict construction; United
States v. Peters, prohibiting State nullification of Federal decisions; The Georgia Claim, a case declaring grants of land
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equivalent to a contract, the obligation of which must not be
impaired; the prize case of Rose v. Himely, allowing the court
to look into foreign proceedings, and annul such as are
irregular; the "Nereide," where neutral goods on a belligerent armed ship were exempt from capture (a peculiar opinion
reversed by the British rule); the Dartmouth College Case;
the Trial of Aaron Burr; the case of Sturges v. Crowninsield,
like the Dartmouth College Case, touching the obligation of
contracts and annulling the Insolvent Act of New York;
.ilcCnllockz v. Maryland, a powerful blow at State Sovereignty,
and making a vast addition to the powers of the Federal
Government; Gibbons v. Ogden, concerning State commerce;
Craigv. Missouri, as to the emission of bills of credit; and
the Cherokee Indian Case. At these few principles we will
look only for a moment, remembering that many other cases
were handled during this time, but none bearing so directly pn
the accumulating power of the central national system-hence
not so directly within the-scope of the present thought.
Of the three grand departments of the government of the
United States, the one which is the most remarkable, both in its
power and in the history of its personnel, is that department
which is peculiar to our nation and which is the product of
the world-famed American creative ability. The judicial
branch of the American government has attracted the admiration of the legal world since the handing down of its first
decisions. To-day it is the final authority, and hence the
most autocratic of our several self-created rulers. Yet the
great proportion of our people know little about it, and realize
even less its wonderful importance as a factor in our pursuit of
happiness.
The commentators on American Government
pronounce the various departments of the Federal government
to be co-extensive, where the functions of the one end, those
of the other begin, there being no overlapping and no conflict
of authority. This thought is almost correct but for a few
instances.
Doubtless, the framers of the Constitution, if they had any
concerted intention, meant that the several parts of their
creation should have their individual functions and powers
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untrammeled by those enjoyed by the Government as a whole,
and preserved from conflict with each other. Whether this
object has been conserved, the careful student of history and
government can best answer. And whether it was meant that
one should dominate as a conservative final arbitrator between
the governor and the governed, there is a division of opinion.
That there has been a conflict between the several heads of
our sovereignty is unquestionable-That the judicial department
has risen superior in the conflict; the conditions of to-day are
the best evidence. But this is no assurance that there will not
come a change. And in forming an opinion on such a possibility let us consider the reason for the present supremacy.
The preservation of the purity, integrity, and power of the
Federal Judiciary is absorbingly important. The first and
foremost intelligence of the Infant Republic realized this and
it is curious to note the striking inconsistency in the public
mind of that day.
When the colonies were writhing under the iron heel of the
oppresive central government of Great Britain, the politicians
and statesmen rose in their wrath and denounced despotism,
declaring that the voice of the people should be paramount in
all pure governments. So sincere were the expressions of the
oppressed that even when the causes of complaint were
removed they precipitated war for the naked principle of
political liberty. Who has ever questioned the colonial faith
in government by the people? The land fairly shrieked at the
suggestion of centralization. And from the snow-bound forest
of Maine to the everglades of Georgia, the people clamored for
popular government and local independence.
At the close of the war for Independence, the leaders of the
young sovereignty met to formulate a suitable government.
They created, of course, a popular assembly. They provided,
as expected, an executive, the choice of the people, but when
they came to complete their task did they exhibit a real and
substantial faith in their hard fought for principles of
Democracy? The Supreme Court, a monument to the
sagacity of those early patriots, is at the same time a glaring
inconsistency. It illustrates even a lack of faith in popular
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representatives, for far from being elected by the masses, it is
filled by appointment of the indirectly elected executive, "by
and with the advice and consent" of the still more indirectly
elected Senate.
Observe that this is the autocratic final
dictator from which there is no appeal, and it is removed
as far from popular sentiment as it was possible under
our scheme of constitutional government. Those first patriots
had cried out and fought for popular government, but
when they proceeded to form one, the most perfect result
of their labors, was, in effect, a despotism more absolute than
the one -under which they had so cruelly suffered.
The mind of man has never created a better scheme than
the American Judiciary, yet it is remarkable that it should
have sprung into existence despite such conflicting sentiments.
The executive of the United States, a more independent
agent than many a so-called absolute monarch, is trammeled
as well as the Congress by the Supreme Court, over whose
decisions there is no higher supervision. In that court we
have a despotism more absolute than is realized. Yet who
feels the yoke, and who, if he does feel it, appreciates a sensation which is not a pleasure?
The absolute power of the despot is the most valuable and
perfect characteristic of government, when vested in one
worthy of the confidence. It is the frailty of human nature
that renders it necessary that we divide the sovereignty among
all in order to supplement the good qualities of the many and
counteract the bad elements that might dominate in the
individual.
A weak or corrupt incumbent of the bench would be almost
beyond this remedy and the evil consequence might have
wrecked our national career long ere this. The strength and
supremacy of. the Superior Court is as much due to the
character of the judges who have ornamented the tribunal as
to the constitutional provisions under which they have proceeded. The predominant feature of the Federal bench has
been the purity and the industry of its judges. The legal
ability of all of the members of the Supreme Court has been
of a high order, that of Marshall marvelous, while Washington,
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Ellsworth, Story and Curtis would have been leading powers
among the first jurists of any land. Few have been commonplace, many have been celebrated in the field of statesmanship
and diplomacy, and none have been questioned in their judgment save Taney, whose brilliant record, but for one decision,
would have illuminated, to the eclipse of all, the annals of
American law.
Jay, one of the first diplomatists of his time, a figure inseparable from the executive and legislative history of our National
foundation, was great before he made great our judiciary.
Chase, a most creditable jurist during his short career, had,
before assuming the judicial ermine, made world-famous the
financial powers of his nation. Like Hamilton, he struck the
dry rock of our national resources and an abundant stream of
revenue gushed forth at a moment when the credit of the
Union was suspended in the balance. To touch upon the
record of many another, luminous with deeds of wisdom,
brilliant with the sheen of silver oratory, and gorgeous in
moral strength, would occupy too long. It is with the court
at its zenith that we are to spend a moment-that court made
immortal by Marshall.
The Supreme Court of the United States grew out of the
unsettled condition of maritime jurisdiction. There is no
doubt but that a national judiciary would have been demanded
on other and even more pressing needs, but it so happened
that the first call upon the colonies for some definite central
judicial authority was made by those engaged in maritime
capture. The early Congress established a Court of Appeals
in cases of capture, and on this, the first central colonial
institution, we find erected our great National Institution.
Its decisions were subsequently upheld by the United States
Supreme Court. Besides the various important maritime
cases decided in the first epoch of the judicial history of the
country, there were two important questions settled, one that
a state is amenable to the authority of the National Court and
hence its sovereignty is subordinate to the National Sovereignty,
and later it was decided that the National Tribunal had no
jurisdiction in common law questions. Such matters belong
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exclusively to the State Courts. This latter point was decided
otherwise at first by Jay, C. J., but before the close of this
period, Washington, J., had reversed the ruling bearing out the
views of Judge Chase. The admirable decisions of the court
under Oliver Ellsworth made the court famous and, too, there
were numerous points of jurisdiction then established which
have guided the legal course of procedure ever since.
Such is a very short statement of a few of the leading
matters which had occupied the judicial attention of those who
preceded Marshall and his court.
John Marshall was appointed Chief Justice of the United
States by President John Adams and entered upon his duties
in February, i8oi. He had for the previous year succeeded
Mr. Henry as Secretary of War, and immediately afterwards
Colonel Pickering as Secretary of State, which latter office
he had filled, during his one year of service, with distinguished
ability.
When, on the resignation of Ollver Ellsworth, the President
proceeded to select a successor, no one expected the choice
would fall on so young a man. Judges Paterson and Cushing
being foremost as the senior justices, had a prior claim, and
the President had offered the honor to John Jay. On his
declining to again preside, the next choice fell to Marshall,
and this appointment was the wisest act of Adams' administration. Marshall found as his compeers, William Cushing, of
Massachusetts; William Paterson, of New Jersey; Samuel
Chase, of Maryland; Bushrod Washington, of Virginia, a
nephew of George Washington; and Alfred Moore, of North
Carolina, soon to be succeeded by William Johnson, of South
Carolina.
Chase and Washington were both men of the same vigorous
and well trained legal talent as that of the Chief Justices.
Paterson and Cushing were men of opposite careers, Cushing
having been on the bench since the Revolution, as Chief Justice
of Massachusetts, while Paterson had been a law maker, sitting
in Congress and in Conventions, systematizing the State laws
and filling the offices of Governor and Chancellor of New
Jersey. They were unusual men. The same can hardly be7
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said of Moore or Johnson. Justice Moore was but a short time
with the court and Johnson during his thirteen years of service
did not rank in intellectual flexibility with his associates. His
judgment was sound, but little varied, while his mind was not
trained to versatility of method.
Such was the court, during the first stage of its existence,
destined to be completely changed before the vigorous
Marshall should yield up his thirty-four years of judicial trust
to the adjudication of that only tribunal higher than his own,
from which there is no appeal.
The Chief Justice was a tall slender man with black hair and
small bright eyes, alert, yet calm and dignified of exprzssion.
His manners were unostentatious and modest, and although
his thoughts were couched in precise and clear language, his
conversation was hardly elegant, rather too genial and familiar
to bear the impression of great repose. The unpretentious,
straight-forward simplicity, coupled with'the soundness and
certainty of his thought, was what impressed immediately, and
the accute and penetrating intellect was bound to dominate.
He was born in Virginia in 1755, and at a very early age
showed signs of his coming ability. He was but eighteen
when he entered the Revolutionary Army, as a lieutenant, and
served until 1779, through the most vigorous campaigns.
The next year he came to the bar of Virginia, but returned
for another campaign with the army. Two years later he was
in the Virginia Legislature. From the very beginning of
his professional career he showed an unparalleled ability which
drew him into the councils of the nation and the first place of
administration long ere he had reached the noon-tide of manhood. When it was said that Mansfield himself did not furnish
a standard by which to measure the capacity of Marshall, he
was not paid too high a tribute nor did his prototype suffer
from the remark. Mansfield was the pride of his country;
Marshall was the wonder of his.
"One of the few the immortal names that was not born to
die." And he who distinguished himself in keeping alive the
memory of that name (as Napoleon said of his biographer) in
so doing, if for nothing else, he must share his immortality.
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So, too, shall we always think of Story as the admirer and
constant helper of the mighty jurist.
The first serious question presented to this court was that
involving the relation of the State in its Legislation to the
Federal Constitution, and the authority of the Federal Judiciary to take cognizance in case of a conflict. This was a
serious matter; it penetrated to the very base of our institutional existence, and while it is easy to see to-day that the
state legislatures are bound to follow the National Constitution,
and that it is the function of the organ interpreting the National
Constitution to see that the legislatures so follow, still it was
not so clear a century ago, and the decision in this case,
lMarbury v. Madison, was a corner-stone in our centralized
nation of to-day. It had been decided that acts contrary to
the Constitution were void, but what power was to sit upon
the question was theretofore unsettled. In a subsequent
question the court struck a decisive blow at the power of the
National Legislative branch, and in pronouncing the fact that
its powers were defined and limited, held that it was for the
judiciary to interpret the definition and point out the limitations.
Power not granted is denied. The Federal Government is
one of delegated powers, and such as do not appear in the
articles of delegation do not exist-this is the underlying
thought. And the judicial branch proceeded to escape from
the bonds by arrogating the power of pronouncing the metes
and bounds of Federal jurisdiction, which were to trammel the
other branches of government, but to which the court by this
very act seemed to rise superior.
The states were next denied the right to share in this prerogative nor could they annul a Federal judicial act.
In the next step taken, while deciding a case under the
denial of the right of a state to impair the obligation of a
contract, a state was placed at the bar of the court on a par
with an individual, and it was held that its grants were the
same as an individual's contracts, and could not be repealed
if so doing impaired the obligation of a contract. All this
while there occupied the Presidential Chair that pattern of
what we understand as Democracy-Thomas Jefferson.
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Jefferson believed, and every true follower of him should
believe, that the vital stream of our national life took its rise
in the sovereignty of the individual states, and that the only
sovereignty possessed by the Federal Government sprang
from the shares delegated expressly, not impliedly, by the
several states. He believed that in destroying the source of
the stream you would dry up the mighty river of our nationality. With Adams and Marshall the rule was reversed.
They believed that in curtailing the delegated sovereignty you
would deplete the strength of the nationality and jeopardize
the existence of the state. The well-being of the states depended on strong centralization, and in the conflict thus waged
between court and administration, it is clear that the former
has been victorious. Adams has won, but the influence of
the profoundly intellectual Jefferson has steadied the national
bark through many troubled waters and helped to check the
federalistic precipitation of its course.
Thomas Kilby Smit.
(To be concluded.)

